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The purpose of this report is to determine, within a reasonable 
margin of error, a target price for Deutsch Lufthansa AG and to 
provide an investment recommendation. To this end, I conducted 
a thorough analysis of the company in order to best forecast future 
cash flows. The methodology followed to value the company was 
the DCF method. It was accompanied by a multiples analysis and 
a sensitivity analysis. I reached a hold recommendation and I 
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▪ After a careful evaluation, our investment recommendation for 
Lufthansa AG is HOLD, with a target price of 15.87€. The stock currently 
trades at 16.256€. The predominant recommendation in the market is 
HOLD.  
▪ The FY20 price target was based on a DCF valuation. It implies 
a capital gain of -2.38% and a total shareholder gain of 3.66%. 
▪ The market environment is very tough for European Network 
Carriers. The industry is dealing with persistent overcapacity coming 
from low cost carriers and consumers are becoming increasingly more 
price sensitive. Fuel costs outlook is favourable, however Lufthansa 
has been struggling with continuous strikes. Negotiations with workers 
‘unions have been largely unsuccessful. 
▪ Lufthansa will scrap long-haul flights from Eurowings giving this 
segment a clearer strategic focus. The segment is expected to reach 
breakeven by 2021. 
▪ Cargo transportation is benefiting from strong economic growth 
in the Asia Pacific region. MRO continues to perform well thanks to strong 
demand for aircraft. Lufthansa is planning to sell its Catering segment. 
 
Company description 
Lufthansa AG is the biggest aviation company operating in Europe in 
terms of revenues. It operates in passenger transportation, cargo 
transportation, MRO, Catering and other aviation services. Its passenger 
airline group is divided into two separate business segments: Network 
Airlines and Eurowings. Europe accounts for over half the group’s 
revenue. Lufthansa is headquartered in Cologne, Germany and is part of 
the DAX 30 index. 
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Company description  
 Originally founded in 1926, Deutsche Lufthansa AG was forced to cease 
operations after the end of World War II. In 1953, the now known Deutsche 
Lufthansa AG was reformed and later assumed the name of its predecessor1. In 
1977, Lufthansa became one of the founding members of Star Alliance, the world's 
largest airline alliance with 21.9% of total scheduled flights in 2018 (in RPKs)2. 
Headquartered in Cologne, Germany LUFTHANSA is as of 2018, the largest airline 
in Europe in terms of revenue, employees and RPK3 (Exhibit 1).  
As part of the Lufthansa group in addition to its own businesses it owns a myriad 
of other airlines and aviation-related companies the most important of which being 
Lufthansa Technik (MRO segment) and LSG Sky Chefs (Catering segment).  
LUFTHANSA4 operations are divided into 5 main business segments. They are 
Network Airlines, Eurowings, Logistics, MRO and Catering. 
Despite the group's highly segmented nature its core activity is quite clearly 
passenger transportation. It is comprised by the Network Airlines and Eurowings 
segments. Altogether they represent 73% of Lufthansa total external revenues 
(Exhibit 2).  
Business Segments 
Network Airlines 
The largest share of revenues (61%) is generated by Network Airlines (Exhibit 2). 
This segment includes Lufthansa German Airlines, SWISS International Air Line 
and Austrian Airlines. The segment positions itself as more of a premium service5. 
According to a consumer’s survey conducted by Skytrax6, Lufthansa German 
Airlines, Swiss International Air Line and Austrian Airlines are the top 3 European 
Airlines. Moreover, in total these 3 companies deliver a comprehensive route 
network comprised of 287 destinations in 86 countries at its peak during the 
summer season. This means, they serve passengers in routes with less 
 
1 In 1953 Deutsche Lufthansa AG was known as Luftag. 
2 According to Star Alliance. 
3 A revenue passenger kilometer (RPK) denotes number of passengers flown per kilometer. 
4 LUFHANSA when written in capital letters refers to the Lufthansa’s group 
5 Starting from 28.11.19 Lufthansa has cut its on-board catering offerings in its economy and premium economy class. This may have an 
impacting its premium alignment in the mind of consumers and impact its Skytrax ranking in 2020. 





















employees RPK in m
IAG 24,406 63,531 270,565
SAS 4,436 10,445 39,383
Ryanair 7,697 15,938 109,988
Lufthansa 35,844 135,534 284,484
Easyjet 7,224 14,751 106,191
Air France KLM 26,515 84,714 283,947
Exhibit 1: European Airlines - key 
information (2018) 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 2: Revenue distribution per 
business segment (2018) 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 4: Network Airlines revenue 
geographic distribution (2018) 








Air France KLM 9.338
Exhibit 3: Yields per Airline (2018) 












competitors. For these reasons, Network Airlines benefits from higher yield7 than 
its competitors (Exhibit 3). 
Network Airlines follows a multi-hub strategy. This means, passengers are 
bypassed from their desired destination to a central hub whereupon they are then 
redirected to their final destination. By operating in this way Network Airlines can 
greatly reduce its operating costs because it can use its aircraft capacity more 
efficiently. On the first flight where there is lower demand, it can use smaller aircraft 
and, on the flights from the central hub it can use bigger more cost-efficient aircraft. 
This strategy allows Network Airlines to operate in routes that would be otherwise 
unprofitable. This strategy is the most commonly used in Europe and it is the one 
followed by most legacy carriers. 
As of 2018, most of its revenues are concentrated in Europe and America, 41.44% 
and 32.89% respectively (Exhibit 4). During the year it flew 232244m RPK and 
284740m ASK8 with a corresponding 81.6% load factor9. 
Eurowings 
The Eurowings segment10, includes the airlines Eurowings, Germanwings, 
Eurowings Europe and Brussels Airlines. It also includes an equity investment in 
Sun Express, a Turkish airline. Eurowings' concept is based on greater efficiency 
and competitive pricing, targeting price sensitive travellers. This is a clearly distinct 
consumer target from Network Airlines and thus they follow a completely different 
business strategy from Network Airlines.  
As opposed to Network Airlines, Eurowings operates in the high traffic routes and 
follows a point to point strategy, meaning it delivers direct flights. As opposed to 
Network Airlines, Eurowings’ model is based on larger economies of scale, thus it 
relies on higher air traffic volume and higher load rates per flight. It uses smaller 
aircraft (which are generally less efficient) and benefits from lower yields. This 
model is the one commonly used by LCCs11. 
This segment is divided between short-haul and long-haul flights, on a 75% and 
25% basis (Exhibit 4). As a rule, yields go down with distance due to unit costs but 
the current trend in the market is a decrease in yields in the short-haul12 market 
and an increase in the long-haul13 market due to overcapacity in the short-haul 
segment. With Eurowings’ new strategy defined in 2019 being to scrap all long-
 
7 Yield is the average fare per passenger per kilometer. 
8 Available seat kilometer (ASK) denotes number of available seats flown per kilometer. 
9 Load factor denotes the percentage of available seats flown occupied. It is the ratio between RPK and ASK. 
10 The Eurowings segment (not the Airline) was formerly known as Point to Point. It was renamed in 2018. 
11 A Low-Cost Carrier (LCC) is an airline that is operated with a high emphasis on minimizing operating costs. 
12 Short-haul denotes flights with a duration bellow 6 hours. 

































Exhibit 4: Eurowings Short-haul and 
Long-haul split 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 5: Eurowings growth spurt 
following Air Berlin acquisition 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 6: Eurowings revenue 
geographic distribution (2018) 
Source: Company Data, Bloomberg 
Acquisition of key 
parts of Air Berlin 
 
 








haul flights due to its larger than expected losses, the change in yield in the short-
haul market will be key for Eurowings’ profitability in the future. Scrapping the long-
haul flights from Eurowings was also motivated by the fact the segment was losing 
its clear identity and becoming complex in its nature: it was targeting price sensitive 
consumers in the short-haul essentially competing with other LCCs but on the long-
haul it was not quite low cost like in short-haul nor quite premium like Network 
Airlines. In 2017, Eurowings took over key parts of Air Berlin one of its former rivals 
leading up to a growth spurt in this segment (Exhibit 5). These included several of 
its aircraft and slots at several airports mainly in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. 
Taking these slots away from the competition mainly the Low-Cost Carriers was a 
key strategic reasoning for this operation. However, the company is having 
difficulties with reducing changes to flight timetables, flight cancellations, delays 
and other operational instability problems that came with it. Lufthansa’s acquisition 
of Air Berlin was a failure with both segments generating losses mainly in the long-
haul segment which the company decided to eliminate. Still, only by 2021 it is 
expected to reach breakeven. In June 2019, Lufthansa issued a profit warning 
downgrading its expected profit margins from 6.5%-8% to 5.5%-6.5%. This 
downgrade was attributed to the weak performance from Eurowings following the 
intense price competition in Europe from LCCs which are contributing to 
overcapacity in the market. This has been affecting several other European airlines 
as well. 
In 2018, it generated EUR 4212m in revenues, a 12% share in the group's 
revenues. During the year it flew 64748m ASK and 52609m RPK, with a 
corresponding 81.3% load factor. As with Network Airlines, its revenues are 
concentrated in Europe and America. In total they account for over 85% of 
revenues (Exhibit 6). 
Logistics  
Lufthansa Cargo makes up the logistics segment. In 2018, it generated EUR 
2713mn in cargo transportation revenue, 7% of total revenue, with a 9.1% 
operating margin. Together with Network Airlines and Eurowings it represents the 
group's total external traffic revenues. Lufthansa Cargo's revenues are 
concentrated on Europe and America (Exhibit 7). 
As of 2018 year-end Lufthansa Cargo’s fleet consisted of five Boeing 777F and 
twelve Boeing MD-11F aircraft. However, it occasionally belies up high capacity 
aircrafts from Network Airlines and Long-Haul Eurowings.  The main driver for 
airfreight demand is world trade which is closely linked to GDP growth and a 
majority of ir comes from e-commerce (Exhibit 8). The ongoing trade dispute 










Middle East and Africa
Exhibit 7: Logistics revenue geographic 
distribution 
Source: Company Data 
 
 








decrease in RTK in the cargo transportation industry (Exhibit 9). In December 2019 
both countries reached a deal to cut tariffs in phases and this was hailed as just a 
fist step in negotiations. However, the consensus among analysts is tensions are 




The MRO segment is comprised by Lufthansa Technik, a world leading company 
in maintenance, repair and overhaul services on civilian aircraft.  
Technik’s range of services comprises eight divisions: aircraft maintenance, 
aircraft overhaul, engine maintenance, component maintenance, aircraft systems, 
development and manufacture of cabin products, development of digital products, 
and initial equipment and servicing of VIP aircraft. Furthermore, all airlines within 
Network Airlines and Eurowings employ Lufthansa Technik for their MRO 
operations amounting to over EUR 2106m in internal revenue. 
This segment has been showing a very strong performance generating EUR 
3812m in 2018, a 10.8% increase compared to 2017 (Exhibit 10). 
Catering 
The catering segment, LSG Group employs 35512 and represents 7% of total 
revenue. It is a leading global provider of airline Catering services. Last year alone, 
according to Lufthansa, it served around 700 million meals worldwide. 
At the time of this writing, Lufthansa is preparing to sell LSG’s European catering 
businesses to Gategroup, a world leading Swiss catering group. The deal extends 
to the retail convenience food Evertaste, the SPIRIANT equipment business and 
operation of the Ringeltaube brand. The concerned businesses generated 1.1bn 





















2015 2016 2017 2018
Exhibit 8: World trade growth rate 
Source: Netherlands CPB 
Exhibit 9: Air E-Commerce share forecast 
Source: ICAO 
Exhibit 10: MRO Historical Revenue 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 11: Catering Historical Revenue 












The decision to sell is part of the Lufthansa's group current strategy of focusing on 
the airline business. It was considered LSG Sky Chefs does not have sufficient 
synergies to justify being part of the Lufthansa group. Furthermore, the company 
has been struggling to generate revenue growth for the past few years. 
However, this potential sale is yet subject to approval by antitrust authorities and 
the company is facing strong resistance from the German service workers union 
Verdi over the sale. Considering the operation hasn’t yet been confirmed and no 
financial details have yet been announced I carried out our valuation as is. 
The emergence of low fares in the industry is a big threat for catering because food 
is one of the first costs cut by airlines in order to reduce fares (as it was the case 
of Lufthansa itself). A key aspect of LSG Sky Chefs is that food preparation has 
less automation than its competitors and is made with fresh ingredients. This 
makes it production more reliant on manual labour and less productive per 
employee (Exhibit 12).  
As of 2018 year-end LSG Sky Chefs is market leader with a 30% market share. Its                       
revenues show a 4 year CAGR of 1% (Exhibit 11). 
The remaining 2% of revenues derive from other aviation services and IT services. 
Compared to 2017 total revenues increased by just 0.74%. MRO, Eurowings and 
Logistics revenue increase of 6.84%, 4.13% and 7.37% was almost completely 
offset by a drop in 2.88% in Network Airlines revenue. This reflects the extreme 









Lufthansa operates in 4 geographic regions (Exhibit 13): Europe, America, Asia 
Pacific and Middle East and Africa. As of 2018, the Europe's region is the most 
important representing 62% total revenue followed by America (21%) and Asia 
Pacific (13%). Middle East and Africa contributes the smallest with 4%. 
Exhibit 12: LSG and main competitors – number of employees and revenue per employee 
Source: Company Data 
 
LSG Group employs 28.63% 
of total employees in 
Lufthansa’s group but 
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Moreover, analysing the historical geographical revenue distribution we can 
observe the importance of Europe in the group's total revenues has been growing 
at the cost of all other regions. For now, though, Lufthansa is not completely reliant 
on its Europe presence. 
 
Dividend Policy 
For the past 4 years, Lufthansa has managed to pay dividends to its shareholders 
(Exhibit 14). Currently, dividend per share is set to 80 cents per share same as last 
year and it is expected for it to remain stable in the next few years. In recent years 
payout ratio has been increasing due to a combination of an increase in dividend 
per share and decreasing operating profits. In 2018, the dividend yield was 4.1%. 
                                            
                                           Fleet Strategy 
As of the end of 2018 the Lufthansa group operates a total of 763 aircraft (Exhibit 
15), 19 of which operated by Lufthansa Cargo. The average age of the aircraft is 
11.9 years. 
A major event for Lufthansa’s fleet was the acquisition of parts of Air Berlin in 2017 
and posterior absorption of part of its aircraft from LGW and Nikki14 segments into 
Lufthansa’s fleet. In total, 65 aircraft were either bought or leased into the fleet and 
a further 12 aircraft were taken in 2018. 
 
14 LGW and Nikki were subsidiaries of Air Berlin. The European Commission did not approve the acquisition of Nikki but agreed to some 
aircraft being transferred to LGW which were then incorporated into Lufthansa’s fleet 
58% 60%
62% 62%
22% 22% 21% 21%
14% 14% 13% 13%
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Exhibit 13: Revenue per region 
Source: Company data 
Exhibit 14: Dividend per share and 
payout ratio 












As of the end of 2018 there are 195 on Lufthansa's fleet order to be delivered until 
2025 (Exhibit 16), 32 of which are expected to be delivered in 2019. These models 
will replace the older less efficient models currently in the fleet. On average they 
are higher capacity which are more fuel efficient. The A320 neo which represents 
68% of total orders by 2025 is a bigger capacity model over the previous 
generation and has a key focus on fuel efficiency.  
 
                                 
                              Shareholder structure 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG was first listed in 1966 however a majority stake of the 
company remained state-owned. It was not until 1997 the company became fully 
privatized. 
 At 2018 year-end, 53% of the shares were held by institutional investors and 47% 
were held by private individuals. Furthermore, German investors held 72.1% of the 
shares followed by American investors which held 8.5%. This ensures compliance 
with the German Aviation Compliance Documentation Act which demands that a 
majority of Lufthansa's stock must be held by German investors.  
Lansdowne Partners (4.91%), Janus Capital Management (4.01%) and DWS 
Investment GmbH (3.79%) are the top 3 stake holders in the company.  
Acting CEO since 2014 Carlsten Spohr is also Chairman in the Executive Board 
as well as Chairman in the Supervisory Board for Lufthansa Technik AG.  
Lufthansa has 478mn shares outstanding without any preferred stocks 




Exhibit 16: Fleet Orders 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 13: Lufthansa's total fleet and aircraft on order/option 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 17: Shareholder's structure by 
nationality (2018) 













                               Sector Analysis  
Deutsche Lufthansa AG classifies in the Passenger Transportation - Consumer 
Discretionary sector, thereby competing in the global Airline Industry with 
passenger transportation being its main operating activity. Nonetheless, the group 
is also involved in other aviation activities as it was previously mentioned in 
Company Description section.  
In the decades following the Deregulation Act of 1978 in the US and the single 
European Act of 1986 and others that followed across the globe, the airline industry 
changed drastically. Prior to this type of deregulation legislation, most nations 
heavily regulated which companies could operate in each route, establishing 
quasi-monopolies in certain city pairs therefore leading to higher fares. 
Furthermore, entering the market was much more difficult due to limitations 
imposed by regulation, in particular, imposing that the majority of each airline´s 
equity was state-owned.  
Nowadays, the market is more fragmented and more competitive, and consumers 
have access to several price comparing websites which results in lot of bargaining 
power on the consumer's side.  
These developments have contributed to the growing emergence of LCCs. In 
2018, LCCs accounted for 31% of market’s RPK almost doubling its market share 
in 12 years (Exhibit 20). 
These airlines have very aggressive price strategies but rely on high volumes to 
generate revenue. To reduce costs, they cut unnecessary services such as food 
catering, extra baggage space, on flight services, etc. A deeper analysis of these 
airlines will be made in the competitor’s section.   
Key Value Drivers 
Air traffic's share of world GDP is on a growing trend, representing roughly 1% in 
2018. Ongoing globalization and increase in productivity in emergent countries as 
well has a growing percentage of GDP being spent in tourism in major countries 
has been leading to this development.  
GDP in real terms is highly correlated with RPK (Exhibit 21) which makes it an 
important metric for any airline. As we have seen 62% of revenue is concentrated 
in Europe making it the most important region for Lufthansa’s performance. 




Exhibit 19: Domestics Passenger Yields 
for Japanese airlines and average U.S. 
domestic routes 




Exhibit 20: LCCs Market share 
Source: Statista 
















Looking at real GDP forecasts from World Bank (Exhibit 23), Europe (62% of 
revenue) is expected to grow below 2% per year similarly to North America (21% 
of revenue) while the Asia Pacific (13% of revenue) region is expected to grow at 
around 4% by 2022.   
Regarding inflation IMF is predicting overall inflations to go down in 2019 and in 
the case of Europe and Middle East regions they are forecasted to become 
negative but go up afterwards and then plateau. Asia Pacific is the region with the 
highest expected inflation rate by 2024, just above 6% (Exhibit 22). 
 
Air traffic measured in RTK within Europe and North America is expected to grow 
at a slower pace than the rest of the world, 3.60% and 3.10% respectively versus 
4.6% (Exhibit 24). This performance is in line with past trends and is a result of 
these markets being the most mature in the world. Furthermore, according to IATA, 
plans for infrastructure in Europe aren't ambitious enough to support future 
demand. Thus, the region’s growth is being hampered by capacity constraints. The 
implication is Lufthansa will likely focus on consolidation in Europe and competition 
for air slots in airports will become increasingly more important in the region. 
Regarding cargo transportation, as seen in the previous section (Exhibit 7) most 
revenue come from the Asia Pacific region (43.41%) and the America region 
(41.88%). While growth rate within North America is just 2.3% (well below the 4.2% 
world average) cargo transportation from North America to Asia Pacific and within 
Asia Pacific (and within China in particular) is expected to grow at higher rates than 
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Exhibit 23: Real GDP growth forecast (2018-2022) 





















A major challenge for the airline industry's profitability is oil prices. In 2018 oil costs 
represented 22.46% of Lufthansa’s total operating costs (Exhibit 26).  
Therefore, price variations in jet fuel can significantly impact Lufthansa’s 
profitability. Unfortunately, jet fuel and crude oil the material from which the former 
is done is highly volatile. In fact, between in just the 4 years between 2013 and 
2016, the market saw the drop from the highest recorded price per barrel 110.62$ 
to the lowest 26.21$. 
This risk is mitigated by hedging crude oil. This commodity is cheaper to hedge 
than kerosene because it is more liquid in the market and since it is highly 
correlated to jet fuel prices it works as a good proxy (Exhibit 27). In fact, this is the 
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Exhibit 25: RTK growth rate forecast (2019-2038) 
Source: Boeing 
 
Exhibit 27: Historic relationship between Brent Crude Oil and Aviation 
Jet Fuel Price 














Exhibit 26: Operation Expenses 
Source: Company data 












Since 2012, the USA has almost doubled their oil production to over 12 million 
daily barrels (Exhibit 28). It has become the biggest oil exporter in the world with 
18% of global supply (Exhibit 29). As a response OPEC, responsible for around 
30% of total production, has been continually cutting production in an effort to rise 
crude prices. To this end, in December 2019 OPEC has decided to cut an 
additional 500000 barrels a day, the equivalent of 0.5% of global output, through 
the end of March 2020. The recent IPO of Saudi Aramco was a major reason for 
OPEC’s decision. 
Nonetheless, by World Bank forecasts, on year average terms, oil prices in 2019 
will be lower than in 2020 and they are expected to continue to decrease in 2020. 
Thereafter they will increase at a lower rate. On 2030 oil price per barrel is 
expected to be 70$ (Exhibit 30). 
 
Market Share 
Known as the Europe’s big 5 IAG, Air France, Lufthansa, Ryanair and EasyJet 
represent half of the entire European Airline market. Lufthansa is market leader 
with a 12% market share (Exhibit 31). 
Some of the main challenges in Europe include the reduction of yields, subpar 
economic growth in the region when compared to the rest of the world and 
congested airports and infrastructure handicapping future growth. Unsurprisingly, 
breakeven load factor in Europe is the highest of any region in the world. 
Moreover, a key characteristic of the European market is that it is very fragmented 
and as a result very competitive. In fact, according to European Regions Airline 
Association (ERA) there are 195 airlines in Europe offering scheduled passenger 
services, compared to 98 in North America for example.  
Consequently, there are a growing number of airline failures and takeovers from 
bigger competitors. This was the case of Air Berlin in 2017 being taken over by 
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Exhibit 28: USA Daily Oil production (in 
mn barrels) 
Source: EIA 
Exhibit 29: Share in world's production  
Source: EIA 
Exhibit 30: Brent Crude Oil average price per year forecast ($/bbl) 
Source: World Bank 
 
Exhibit 31: Lufthansa's market share in 
Europe 
Source: Aviator 
Exhibit 32: Top 5 Airline Bankruptcies 
Source: Aerotime Hub 
 
 








and Thomas Cook to mention a few (Exhibit 32) went bankrupt leaving routes open 
to be filled by the big 5. 
Lufthansa’s second biggest market in terms of passenger transportation revenue 
is North America. In this region, market is much more consolidated with 77% being 
captured by 4 airlines alone. Unlike in Lufthansa’s home market, in North America 
Lufthansa is not a market leader (Exhibit 33). 
Competitors 
 Lufthansa main competitors are the network carriers International Consolidated 
Airlines (IAG), Air France KLM and Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and the low-cost 
carriers Ryanair and EasyJet.  
 Ryanair, EasyJet and SAS15 only generate revenue from passenger transportation 
while Air France operates in the same segments Lufthansa does – Passenger, 
Cargo, MRO and Catering. IAG operates in passenger transportation and cargo 
only. 
 Lufthansa is the biggest airline amongst its peers either by total revenue 
generated, RPK and number of employees. However, by RPK, Lufthansa is only 
slightly above Air France KLM and IAG. At the same time, its load factor is one of 
the lowest among its peers (only above Scandinavian Airlines) while Ryanair and 
EasyJet have highest load factor rates (Exhibit 34).  
Regarding cargo transportation revenue Lufthansa competes with Air France KLM 
and IAG as the market leader. It also enjoys higher yield and revenue cargo tonne 







 Observing Exhibit 36 another key difference between service orientated providers 
and low-cost carriers becomes clearly noticeable. The latter operate with a much 
lower number of employees per aircraft. As it was previously said they focus on 
 

























employees RPK in m Load factor
IAG 24,406 1,173 63,531 270,565 83%
SAS 4,436 34 10,445 39,383 75%
Ryanair 7,697 — 15,938 109,988 96%
Lufthansa 35,844 2,713 135,534 284,484 81%
Easyjet 7,224 — 14,751 106,191 92%
Air France KLM 26,515 2,288 84,714 283,947 88%
Exhibit 34: Key figures of Lufthansa and main competitors 
Source: Company data, Bloomberg 
 
 








volume rather than on yield to be profitable. For this end, they provide passengers 
with as much a basic package as possible in terms of service. For example, LCCs 
do not usually provide meals on board and passengers cannot carry as much 
baggage weigh. Instead these services and others like priority embarking are 
provided at an extra cost for the passenger16. These extra revenues are called 
ancillary revenues.  
In fact, yield is usually higher on network airlines because they charge every 
passenger for those extra services they provide, in other words they are imbued in 
the total price of the ticket regardless if the passenger wishes to use them or not. 
On the other hand, load factors are usually higher in LCCs because most 
passengers are very price sensitive and prefer to fly in LCCs. 
Moreover, Lufthansa generates a higher yield than its peers (Exhibit 37) but it also 
struggles with higher CASK17. It has a cost per ASK of 9.7 cents while the average 
is 7 cents. The low-cost carriers have the lowest CASK since they provide only 
basic services and thus need less employees (driving the average down). Ignoring 










For Lufthansa a quarter of all operating expenses comes from staff making it the 
most important operating cost, followed by fuel costs which account for 17% 
(Exhibit 38). These two costs are the most significant between all network carriers 
in our peer group. Air France KLM’s staff costs account for almost a third of total 
operating costs and a fifth comes from fuel expenses. In the case of SAS, staff 
 
16 Revenue derived from goods and services other than the flight itself is called ancillary revenue 














Exhibit 36: Comparison on number of 
employees per aircraft between Lufthansa 
and its main competitors 
Source: Company data 
 
Exhibit 37: Comparison of yield and CASK between Lufthansa and main competitors 




Tonne Kilometers Cargo Yield
Cargo 
Revenue
IAG 5713 21 1173
Lufthansa 10907 25 2713
Air France KLM 8657 14 2288
Exhibit 35: Cargo Metrics Comparison 
Source: Company Data 
 
 








costs are also the most important costs (22%) followed by fuel (19%) while for IAG 
fuel costs account for more than staff costs, 24% vs 20%.  
In the case of Ryanair and EasyJet, Staff costs are much less significant for the 
reasons mentioned previously. In the case of Ryanair fuel prices are clearly the 
main portion of operating costs (36%) followed by Airport and Handling Charges 
(16%) and finally staff costs (15%). In the case of EasyJet, Airport and Handling 
Charges account for 30% of total operating expenses while fuel and staff account 
for 22% and 14% respectively.  In sum, in Low Cost Carriers Airport and Handling 
charges are more significant than in network airlines and fuel costs also account 

















































































































































Exhibit 38: Lufthansa and its competitors cost structure 






































Regarding fuel efficiency, fuel costs per ASK are dependent on prices which are an 
external factor and airline’s hedging policy. Depending on market conditions a 
hedging policy might increase or decrease oil prices. In 2018, Ryanair had the 
highest fuel cost per ASK in the peer group (21 cents per ASK) and EasyJet the 
lowest with 14 cents per ASK (Exhibit 39). Lufthansa had a cost of 1.7 cents per 
ASK which is in line with the average. 
In terms of profitability ratios, IAG and Ryanair have much higher EBIT, EBITDA 
and Profit margins compared to their competitors (Exhibit 40). Lufthansa, EasyJet 
and Air France KLM have similar EBIT Margins (8%, 7% and 5% respectively) and 
EBITDA Margins (14%, 15% and 16%). However, in terms of profit margins Air 
France KLM shows a very low profit margin of 2% while Lufthansa and EasyJet 
have profit margins of 6% and 5% respectively. SAS shows ratios well below its 
peers in terms of EBIT, EBITDA and profit margins with 1%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Overall, Lufthansa has trouble to compete with Ryanair and IAG since 
they benefit from significantly better profit margins, but it is in a favourable position 
against other network carriers. 
Regarding return on equity with the exception of IAG which shows a much higher 
rate than its peers leading to a higher average (21%), Lufthansa with a rate of 23% 
shows the highest return on equity among its peers. It is followed by Air France 
KLM and Ryanair with 19% and 18% respectively. In terms of ROA IAG is also the 
airline with highest rate with 10%, followed by Ryanair with 7%. Lufthansa has a 
return on assets of 6% which puts it slightly above the average of 5%. Air France 
has the lowest rate, 1%. In terms of ROIC Lufthansa is on par with IAG as market 
leaders in this metric with 14% and 15% respectively. Ignoring the market outlier 












Fuel cost per 
ASK
IAG 5283 324808 0.016
SAS 918 52371 0.018
Ryanair 2427 114571 0.021
Lufthansa 6087 349489 0.017
Easyjet 1602 116056 0.014
Air France KLM 4958 323034 0.015
Exhibit 39: Fuel expenses per ASK 





Margin ROE ROA ROIC
IAG 15% 21% 12% 43% 10% 15%
SAS 1% 5% 1% 12% 2% 3%
Ryanair 13% 22% 11% 18% 7% 11%
Lufthansa 8% 14% 6% 23% 6% 14%
Easyjet 7% 15% 5% 11% 5% 0%
Air France KLM 5% 16% 2% 19% 1% 6%
Exhibit 40: Key Financial Ratios of Lufthansa and competitors 
Source: Company data 
 
 








Forecasting of key captions 
                               Revenue 
Revenue was forecasted on a per segment basis and for the traffic revenue 
segments (Network Airlines, Eurowings and Logistics) an analysis per region was 
conducted as well as well. 
Revenue in Network Airlines and Eurowings is equal to the product between Yield 
and RPK. RPK is determined by the product between ASK (available seat 
kilometers). 
Revenue in Logistics is calculated on a similar way but using RTK instead. RTK is 
a similar metric to RPK but used for cargo instead of passengers. It is measured 
in tonne of cargo transported rather than in passengers..   
Network Airlines 
As part of the group overall strategy, Network Airlines is buying new generation 
aircraft such as the A320 neo which is up to 5% more fuel efficient than the 
previous model which is still present in Lufthansa’s fleet. At the same time 
Lufthansa is reducing the number of aircraft models in its fleet. These measures 
are expected to lead to higher cost efficiency. 
To forecast future capacity the approach followed was to estimate the future 
number of aircrafts per model in the segment’s fleet and compute total capacity 
following the numbers in the annual report regarding the number of seats available 
for each aircraft model. 
To this end, I looked into Lufthansa’s fleet order list up to 2025. Unfortunately, 
Lufthansa does not make public which aircraft are to be allocated for each segment 
but we can infer based on the models currently present in the fleet. In the case of 
the A320 neo even thought there are no aircraft of this type currently in the fleet 
there is the older model (A320 ceo). 
Additionally, it was considered a percentage of aircraft that each year due to 
obsoslescence are terminated or sold. A 1.55% rate was observed in the previous 
year. An historical average was not used instead due to the acquisition of Air Berlin 
in 2017 impacting this metric and making that year atypical. 
During the year some new orders were made and thus the fleet order was updated. 
However, it is expected new orders will continue to be made for the same 
timeframe as in it was made in 2019 (2023-2027). Consequently, forecasting 
capacity basing on fleet orders for 2023 and 2024 would lead underestimations. In 
 
 








fact, implied ASK growth in 2023 and 2024 would be lower than in the previous 
years which seems to confirm this hypothesis. Instead it was assumed ASK in 2023 
and in 2024 would grow at the same rate as it is forecasted in 2023. 
Both load factors and yield are expected to continue to converge with the rest of 
the industry.  
The emergence of Low Cost Carriers is driving yields in the industry down not by 
just competing with lower prices but also by contributing to overcapacity in the 
market. It is the consensus in the industry that LCCs will continue to grow and 
become even more ubiquitous in the airline industry. However, its penetration in 
the market should eventually plateau.                                           
Eurowings 
Eurowings’ current strategy is to focus on the short-haul where yields are higher 
(as a rule yields go down with distance due to unit costs and economy of scale). 
No long-haul aircraft is being ordered to Eurowings at the moment. Thus, capacity 
on the long-haul should decrease every year by 1.55%. Capacity on the short-haul 
is expected to increase. 
Between 2017 and 2018 yields have dropped almost 20% in the short-haul and 
rose 2.82% in the long-haul. The load factor rose over 2% but it is still bellow its 
main competitors in the short-haul Ryanair and EasyJet. So it is expected this trend 
to continue (2% growth in 2020). Regarding yield in the short-haul, since 
Eurowings operates mostly in Europe (a very mature market) where there is no 
perpective of yields rising with inflation, I assumed it to change at the same rate as 
Network Airlines in the Europe region. 
        Logistics 
During spring 2019, 2 new aircraft (the 2 Boeing 777F present in the fleet order). 
Another aircraft was delivered to AeroLogic during the year and it was announced 
2 MD-11F will be retired at the year-end. After 2019 there are no more orders for 
the segment however I do not find reasonable to believe no orders won’t be made 
in the future. In fact, since the fleet is very small there is little incentive to do volume 
orders in advance and instead the company does opportunistic purchases. This 
makes it harder to forecast ATK growth. Moreover, aircrafts from Network Airlines 
and Eurowings are often used to belly up Lufthansa’s cargo capacity. Therefore, 
it was choosen a different approach on forecasting RTK for this segment.  
Exhibit 41: Trade and GDP growth 
Comparison 
Source: WTO and Unctad 
 
 








The approach followed was to forecast RTK per region directly without basing on 
ATK18 and Load Factor. Real GDP growth was used as an proxy to predict demand 
for freight since the degree of correlation between the 2 is very high. Regarding 
yield, according to IATA, air cargo yields only increased by 0.4% between January 
2018 and January 2019. With this in mind and despite quite volatile historical data 
due to USA and China’s trade tensions Lufthansa’s yield will remain fairly constant. 
MRO 
Revenues from maintenance, repairing and overhaul are dependent on the 
number and size of aircrafts in operation worldwide making it a good proxy.  
A study by Airbus predicts world commercial aircraft fleet to more than double in 
the next 20 years at roughly 4% per year CAGR. Revenues from this segment in 
the past have been growing at the same rate so I used past CAGR to forecast 
MRO revenue. 
                                           Catering 
  As mentioned previously, LSG’s will initiate the selling of its European businesses 
in 2020 pending anti thrust authorities’ aproval. These businesses generated about 
one third of LSG’s revenue. In 2020, Lufthansa intends to sell the rest of the group. 
The valuation was conducted without this in line since the operation is yet to be 
confirmed as of this writing. 
The Airline Catering Segment is facing the increasing challenge of a highly price 
sensitive market in Europe which is driving airlines to cut costs in food catering in 
particular. A growth rate according to the past trend was assumed (1.2%). 
                                         Operating Costs  
                                         Aircraft Fuel and Lubrificants 
   In October 2016, the 39th Session of ICAO’s Assembly reached an agreement 
refered as Carbon Offsetting and reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA). Lufthansa will voluntarily follow this agreement and has pledged reduce 
fuel consumption per revenue tonne/killometer by 1.5% per year. I assumed this will 
be respected and computed future fuel costs accordingly. 85% of fuel price 
variations are hedged as per Lufthansa’s hedging policy. 
Staff 
I assumed the number of employees depends on RPK, meaning the higher air traffic 
demand the more employees will be employed. Regarding costs per employee I 
 
18 ATK (available tonne kilometre) denotes tonnes of cargo able to transport per kilometre 













assumed it will grow at a 1% rate. In the past 4 years it has been decreasing however 
this is not reasonable in the long term. Several strikes have been being announced 
over 2019 and Lufthansa has entered negotiations multiple times with worker’s 
unions. However, these have been unsucessful. Most recently, strikes were 
announced for the Christmas Holiday season. 
OUTLOOK 
Real GDP forecasts for Europe are below 2% and well under other regions while 
USA and China trade tensions and other geo-political risks remain a concern 
adversely impacting both passenger and cargo transportation segments. 
Nonetheless, long term forecasts for RPK and RTK are more favourable with growth 
rates above 4%. 
Additionally, Lufthansa is locked in a dispute with three workers’ unions: UFO19, 
Verdi and CU over pay conditions. On a positive note fuel price forecasts are stable. 
A key concern for Lufthansa, is the fact that there is overcapacity in Europe’s airline 
market. This is motivating a price war in air fares which is severely impacting several 
European airlines profitability. 
Valuation 
The target value for December 31st, 2020 is EUR 15.87. It was calculated based on 
the discount cash flow model. The operating result was calculated separately from 
the non-operating segment. Revenue was calculated per segment, but other 
operating income and operating expenses were forecasted together. 
WACC 
Lufthansa’s weighted average cost of capital was determined after estimating each 
of its inputs by specific methodologies. 
I assumed Lufthansa is headed towards fixed net debt/enterprise value and towards 
an equity/enterprise Value ratio in market terms. I assumed a target net debt to 
equity ratio is 70%. It corresponds to the median between its peers. 
The cost of equity was calculated with the help of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
For the risk-free rate, a long-term government bond denominated in the same 
currency as the company’s statements is the best approach. In the case of 
Lufthansa, a 10-year German bund was originally considered. However, the current 
yield is negative, and I do not believe this rate reflects the true risk-free rate. The 
 
19 UFO’s legal recognition of its union status is a matter of dispute with Lufthansa 
 
 








main reason for such a low current yield is the uncertainty in Europe’s economy in 
conjunction with the fact that Germany has been running budget surpluses which 
limits the supply of AAA Bonds in the European market. 
Instead, the 10Y Eurozone Central Government Bond yield as of 2018 was used 
and thus obtained a risk-free rate of 1.14%. 
For the market risk premium, I relied on the estimation by Mckinsey & Company20 of 
5.5%. This estimation was based on a long-term historical average. 
To get the beta I first calculated the rolling 3 years raw beta of the peer group: 
Lufthansa, Air France KLM, IAG and SAS. They were calculated doing a regression 
of each of the company’s weekly returns in the last 3 years against the MSCI World 
Index. 
To unlever each of the peer’s betas, I computed the beta of debt and the debt to 
equity ratio of each peer (the beta of tax shields was assumed as equal to beta of 
the unlevered company).  
Due to the lack of long term bonds for the peers (Lufthansa only had a convertible 
bond in the long term, Air France’s bonds are not rated, IAG finances via CDS only 
and SAS has no active long term corporate bonds) I decided to estimate YTM for 
each peer basing on company’s credit rating and following the Euro EU Compositive 
15Y21. Then I just adjusted the cost of debt by its probability of default and loss given 
default22.  
After unlevering each beta (assuming beta of tax shields equal to beta unlevered) I 
calculated the average unlevered beta of the industry. Finally, I relevered the beta 
using Lufthansa’s target net debt to equity ratio. This beta is between the upper and 
lower bounds of raw beta with a 95% confidence level. Thus, cost of equity is 7.82%. 
The corporate tax rate for Lufthansa is 21.14%. We get an after-tax cost of debt of 
2.68%. 




20 “Valuation – Measuring & Managing the value of companies”, 5th edition by Tim Koller, Mark Goedhart, David Wessels published by 
Wiley, page 237 
21 The Euro EU Composite 15Y gives the average yield to maturity of European bonds with a 15Y per credit rating  
22 Followed “Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rate 1920-2017”, Moody’s 
Lufthansa Air France IAG SAS
Rating Moodys (actual or equivalent) Baa3 Ba3 Baa3 B1
Equivalent Grade YTM Euro composite yield curve BBB- BB- BBB- B+
Classification Investment GradeNon-Investment Grade SpeculativeInvestm nt Grade Highly Speculative
YTM Basing on EUR EU Composite 15Y 2.82% 5.45% 2.82% 5.46%
Prob of Default 0.25% 0.96% 0.25% 1.33%
Rank (assumed) Sr. Unsec Sr. Unsec Sr. Unsec Sr. Unsec
Loss given default 53.90% 53.90% 53.90% 53.90%
Rd 2.68% 4.93% 2.68% 4.75%




rd after tax 2.17%
re 7.82%
Net Debt/Net Debt+Equity 0.41
Equity/Net Debt+Equity 0.59
WACC 5.49%
Exhibit 49: Cost of debt calculations 
Source: Bloomberg 













The core free cash flows between 2021 and 2024 were computed. I used the 
WACC rate calculated previously and assumed a perpetual growth rate of 1.24%23 
to compute core operating value and it by the non-core operations of the company 
mainly represented by pension costs. After deducting net debt and minority 
interests, I got an equity value of 7588m EUR. There isn’t any equity issuance 
planned and there are no preferable shares, so I expect the number of shares 
outstanding to remain constant at 478.1943m. This leads us to a share price of 
EUR 15.87. The dividend yield is 6.05% resulting in a total shareholder gain 








23 Assumed Lufthansa is headed towards the steady state considering ROIC, RR and g forecasts are stable. This value is well below the 
forecasts for the rest of the economy (World Bank 4.34% and Europe 4.24%). However, this value is deemed reasonable considering 
Lufthansa is a mature company in the European market where most of the growth is being captured by LCCs. 
Company Group (in millions EUR) 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F
Core Free Cash Flow 680 620 609 598
Discount Factor 0.948 0.899 0.852 0.808
Discounted Core Free Cash Flow 645 557 519 483
Terminal Value 14,324
Discounted Terminal Value 11,575
Core Value 13,779
Non Core Invested Capital -721





Price per share 15.87
Expected Capital Gain -2.38%
Shareholder cash-in per share 0.98
Dividend Yield 6.05%
Total gain per share 3.66%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F
NOPLAT 1,369 1,760 2,361 2,208 1,504 1,458 1,447 1,466 1,484 1,503
Operating Invested Capital 13876 15751 15011 16328 17045 17879 18646 19492 20367 21272
Investment in Operating Investment Capital 1875 -741 1317 717 834 767 846 875 905
ROIC 11.17% 15.73% 13.52% 8.82% 8.16% 7.76% 7.52% 7.29% 7.06%
RONIC 20.84% -81.15% -11.58% -98.30% -5.41% -1.54% 2.30% 2.07% 2.06%
RR 106.57% -31.38% 59.66% 47.66% 57.22% 53.01% 57.74% 58.95% 60.20%
g 22.21% 25.46% -6.91% -46.85% -3.09% -0.82% 1.33% 1.22% 1.24%
 
 









An analysis on the impact of the discount rate and terminal growth rate was 
conducted as well on some key value drivers mentioned in the Key Value Drivers 
section. 
Exhibit 51 shows Lufthansa’ share price in several scenarios of WACC and 
terminal growth rates. For each input we considered a variation of 0.5 p.p. As we 
can see Lufthansa’ share price can fluctuate from 8.58 EUR to 40.21 EUR in these 
given scenarios which leads us to conclude share price is highly dependent upon 
these two inputs. This is because most of the value from Lufthansa comes from 
the perpetuity period. 
An analysis of fuel price’s impact on share price was also conducted. Despite 
crude oil being hedged up to 85% crude oil price still has a very significant impact 
on Lufthansa’s stock price. This is because fuel costs account for 17% of total 
operating costs24. For example, if fuel price were to increase by 10% share price 
is expected to decrease by 3.41 EUR (Exhibit 52). 
Next the impact of costs per employee on share price was considered. This test is 
especially relevant since it allows us to predict the impact on share price of possible 
developments in Lufthansa’s negotiations with worker’s unions. As we can see if 
costs per employee are to increase at a slightly higher rate than projected (1% per 
year) that would cause share price to plummet (Exhibit 53). In light of this fact, it is 
understandable the lack of success of several negotiations between Lufthansa and 
the worker’s unions throughout 2019. 
Finally, it was conducted one analysis on Lufthansa’s sensibility to yield and load 
factor in its home market (Exhibit 54). In the base case load factor was increasing 
0.18% per year in Europe and yield was dropping 1.98%. These two indicators are 
correlated: a higher load factor results in a lower yield. Fluctuations of 0.20 
percentage points were considered for the analysis between each scenario. 
Between the best-case scenario and the worst-case scenario Lufthansa’s share 
price oscillated between 20.21 and 11.87. Lufthansa’s share price is particularly 
sensitive to variation in yield. In fact, if yield decreases 20 decimal points more 
than projected share price would drop 1.31 EUR. 
 
 
24 Mentioned in the Competitors section 
Exhibit 51: Sensitivity Analysis on 






























15.97 0.69% 0.74% 1.24% 1.74% 2.24%
WACC 6.47% 8.58 8.73 10.48 12.59 15.19
5.97% 10.60 10.79 12.93 15.58 18.93
5.47% 13.05 13.28 15.97 19.37 23.83
4.97% 16.06 16.37 19.82 24.34 30.52



































Exhibit 53: Sensitivity Analysis on Cost 
per Employee  
Source: Author 
Exhibit 54: Sensitivity analysis on Yield 
and load factor in Europe 
Source: Author 
Yield
15.97 -2.38% -2.18% -1.98% -1.78% -1.58%
Load Factor 0.58% 14.94 16.25 17.56 18.88 20.21
0.38% 14.16 15.46 16.76 18.07 19.38
0.18% 13.39 14.68 15.97 17.26 18.56
-0.02% 12.63 13.90 15.18 16.47 17.76
-0.22% 11.87 13.14 14.41 15.68 16.96
 
 









Lufthansa’s main competitors are Ryanair, Air France KLM, IAG, SAS and 
EasyJet.  
Even though Ryanair and EasyJet are main competitors of Lufthansa they have 
clearly different business models and different value drivers and for this reason 
cannot be considered comparable.  
Despite Lufthansa having a low-cost airline segment in the form of the Eurowings25 
it only accounts for 12% of its revenues. Thus, it is more reasonable to compare 
Lufthansa with Air France KLM which owns Transavia or IAG which owns Vuelling, 
their respective low-cost carriers. 
After rejecting low cost carriers, it was also decided to not consider gulf carriers for 
similar reasons. These carriers pay close to no taxes thanks to very low corporate 
rates and have access to subsidized funding and subsidized oil thus they follow 
different ratios. The most important gulf carriers are Turkish Airlines, Emirates, 
Qatar Airlines and Etihad.  
The criteria followed were airlines with similar market capitalization, operating 
under similar market conditions and operating mostly in passenger transportation 
but which preferably also operate in also cargo transportation MRO operations and 
Catering. 
Having selected our peers our first step was to calculate the multiples for each of 
our peers. EV/EBITDA, P/E26, EV/EBIT, Price to book Value, EV/Revenue and 
EV/EBITDAR were the multiples considered. They were calculated using the most 
recent company data. Across all multiples Lufthansa is trading below the peer’s 







25 Eurowings competes with Ryanair and Easyjet in short-haul segment but in the long-haul competes with other leisure 
airlines. This lack of strategic focus was one of the reasons that lead to the decision to start reducing the long-haul 
segment. 
26 AF KLM P/E was not considered because earnings were negative. 
Exhibit 55: Market Valuation of Lufthansa and its peer group 
Source: Company Data 
EV/EBITDA P/E EV/EBIT P/Book EV/Revenue EV/EBITDAR
AF FP Equity 2.81 X -43.97 X 11.82 X 2.28 X 0.40 X 2.81 X
IAG LN Equity 3.84 X 6.62 X 6.27 X 2.16 X 0.76 X 3.14 X
SAS SS Equity 3.08 X 9.38 X 8.83 X 1.11 X 0.20 X 3.72 X
LHA AG Equity 3.05 X 5.40 X 8.67 X 0.83 X 0.37 X 2.93 X
Mean 3.20 X 7.13 X 8.90 X 1.60 X 0.43 X 3.15 X
 
 














Company Group in Millions of EUR 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F
Network Airlines
Traffic Revenue Europe 9,113 9,299 9,520 9,780 10,058 10,345 10,640
Traffic Revenue America 7,234 7,279 7,391 7,555 7,742 7,934 8,131
Traffic Revenue Asia Pacific 4,079 4,156 4,258 4,383 4,518 4,658 4,803
Traffic Revenue Middle East 1,566 1,551 1,564 1,594 1,633 1,672 1,712
Network Airlines Revenue 21,992 22,286 22,733 23,311 23,951 24,609 25,285
Eurowings
Traffic Revenue Short Haul 3,168 3,174 3,264 3,367 3,475 3,581 3,685
Traffic Revenue Long Haul 1,044 1,038 1,032 1,026 1,020 1,015 1,009
Eurowings Revenue 4,212 4,211 4,296 4,393 4,495 4,596 4,694
MRO Revenue 3,812 3,965 4,125 4,290 4,463 4,642 4,829
Logistics
Europe Cargo Revenue 208 215 222 229 237 245 252
America Cargo Revenue 1123 1168 1213 1258 1302 1348 1396
Asia Pacific Cargo Revenue 1,164 1,252 1,348 1,455 1,571 1,696 1,831
Middle East Cargo Revenue 186 185 191 197 203 209 216
Logistics Revenue 2,681 2,820 2,974 3,140 3,313 3,497 3,695
Catering revenue 2,499 2,528 2,557 2,587 2,617 2,648 2,679
Other Revenue 648 654 661 668 674 681 688
Total Revenue 35,844 36,464 37,346 38,389 39,514 40,673 41,870
Other Operating Income 1,818 2,480 2,540 2,611 2,687 2,766 2,847
Total Operating Income 37,662 38,944 39,885 41,000 42,201 43,439 44,717
Changes in inventories and work performed by entity and capitalised531 332 340 350 360 371 382
Aircraft Fuel and Lubrificants 6,087 6,077 6,142 6,249 6,351 6,453 6,557
Other than Aircraft Fuel and Lubrificants 12,582 13,626 13,956 14,345 14,766 15,199 15,646
Total Cost of materials and services 18,669 19,703 20,098 20,595 21,116 21,652 22,202
Staff Costs 8,811 9,188 9,571 9,956 10,345 10,748 11,165
Total operating expenses 32,657 34,763 35,682 36,732 37,824 38,949 40,110
EBITDA 5,005 4,181 4,203 4,267 4,377 4,490 4,607
Total depreciation, amortization and impairment 2,205 2,274 2,354 2,433 2,518 2,608 2,701
EBIT 2,800 1,907 1,849 1,834 1,859 1,882 1,906
NOPLAT 2,208 1,504 1,458 1,447 1,466 1,484 1,503
Non Core
Interest income 68 126 126 101 95 90 85
Total Result of equity Investments 174 133 133 133 133 133 133
Other financial items -46 180 180 180 180 180 180
Non Core Result before Taxes 196 439 439 414 408 402 397
Non Core Taxes 49 110 110 104 102 101 99
Non Core Profit 147 329 329 311 306 302 298
Financials
Interest Expenses -212 -294 -294 -237 -222 -210 -198
Financial Result before Taxes -212 -294 -294 -237 -222 -210 -198
Tax Shield 53 74 74 59 55 52 49
Financial Result after taxes -159 -221 -221 -178 -166 -157 -148
Financials Result -641 -221 -221 -178 -166 -157 -148
Net profit (loss) 2,196 1,612 1,567 1,580 1,605 1,629 1,652
 
 












Cash Flow Statement 
 
 
Company Group in Millions of EUR 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F
Operating Cash 717 729 747 768 790 813 837
Intangible Assets 1,893 1,737 1,835 1,893 2,012 2,098 2,179
Aircraft and reserve engines and repairable parts 18,909 19,502 20,199 20,896 21,620 22,404 23,220
PPE 2,221 2,376 2,434 2,502 2,575 2,650 2,728
Contract Assets 234 234 234 234 234 234 234
Inventories 968 1,022 1,042 1,068 1,095 1,123 1,151
Accounts Receivable 5,576 5,673 5,810 5,972 6,147 6,327 6,513
Loans and Receivables 512 546 560 575 592 609 627
Derivative Financial Instruments 570 1,189 1,218 1,252 1,289 1,327 1,366
Deferred Expenses 335 238 243 250 257 265 273
Other deferred tax asset -200 182 287 397 512 633 759
Core Assets 31,735 33,428 34,608 35,806 37,124 38,484 39,888
Contract Liabilities 2,338 2,378 2,436 2,504 2,577 2,653 2,731
Deferred Tax Liability 583 488 499 513 528 544 560
Income Tax 715 487 472 468 475 481 487
Accounts Payable 5,901 5,752 5,867 6,012 6,164 6,321 6,481
Other Provisions 1,462 1,687 1,727 1,776 1,828 1,881 1,937
Deferred Income 439 1,916 1,962 2,017 2,076 2,137 2,200
Liabilities from unused flight documents 3,969 3,676 3,765 3,871 3,984 4,101 4,221
Core Liabilities 15,407 16,383 16,729 17,160 17,632 18,117 18,616
Core Invested Capital 16,328 17,045 17,879 18,646 19,492 20,367 21,272
Pensions Provisions and respective deferred tax asset 3,534 3,816 3,816 3,816 3,816 3,816 3,816
Securities 1,776 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268
Equity Investments 896 788 788 788 788 788 788
Assets held for sale 9 39 39 39 39 39 39
Non Core Invested Capital -853 -721 -721 -721 -721 -721 -721
Total Invested Capital 15,475 16,324 17,158 17,925 18,771 19,646 20,551
Excess Cash 783 -1,047 0 0 0 0 0
Financial Debt 6,685 6,685 6,685 5,376 5,037 4,759 4,494
Newly issued debt 0 0 -1,309 -339 -277 -265 -252
Total Debt 6,685 6,685 5,376 5,037 4,759 4,494 4,242
Net Financial Assets -5,902 -5,638 -5,376 -5,037 -4,759 -4,494 -4,242
Company Group in Millions of EUR 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E
Core Business
NOPLAT 2,208 1,504 1,458 1,447 1,466 1,484 1,503
Depreciation 2,181 2,249 2,329 2,407 2,492 2,581 2,673
Operational Cash Flow 4,389 3,753 3,787 3,854 3,958 4,065 4,176
Invested Capital - Fixed Assets 23,023 23,615 24,467 25,290 26,208 27,153 28,127
Gross CAPEX -1,911 -592 -852 -823 -917 -945 -975
Net Capex -4,092 -2,841 -3,181 -3,230 -3,409 -3,526 -3,648
NWC 1,360 1,672 1,732 1,796 1,868 1,943 2,021
Other Investments -8,055 -8,242 -8,320 -8,440 -8,583 -8,729 -8,876
∆ NWC 80 -312 -60 -64 -72 -75 -78
∆ Other Investments 514 187 78 120 143 145 148
Investment Cash Flow -3,498 -2,966 -3,163 -3,174 -3,338 -3,456 -3,578
Core Free Cash Flow 891 787 624 680 620 609 598
Non Core Business
Non Operational Cash Flow 147 329 329 311 306 302 298
Invested Capital -853 -721 -721 -721 -721 -721 -721
Investment Cash Flow 1,081 -132 0 0 0 0 0
Non Core Free Cash Flow 1,228 197 329 311 306 302 298
Free Cash Flow 2,119 984 953 990 925 911 896
Financial
Financial Result -159 -221 -221 -178 -166 -157 -148
Change in Net Financial assets -227 -264 -262 -339 -277 -265 -252
Net change in Equity -1,843 -594 -565 -569 -576 -583 -590
Minority Interests 110 95 95 95 95 95 95
Financing Cash Flow -2,119 -984 -953 -990 -925 -911 -896
 
 









Disclosures and Disclaimers 
 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
 
 
This report was prepared by Diogo Ferreira, a Master in Finance student of Nova School of Business and 
Economics (“Nova SBE”), within the context of the Field Lab – Equity Research. 
This report is issued and published exclusively for academic purposes, namely for academic evaluation and 
master graduation purposes, within the context of said Field Lab – Equity Research. It is not to be construed 
as an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. 
This report was supervised by a Nova SBE faculty member, acting merely in an academic capacity, who revised 
the valuation methodology and the financial model. 
Given the exclusive academic purpose of the reports produced by Nova SBE students, it is Nova SBE 
understanding that Nova SBE, the author, the present report and its publishing, are excluded from the persons 
and activities requiring previous registration from local regulatory authorities. As such, Nova SBE, its faculty 
and the author of this report have not sought or obtained registration with or certification as financial analyst by 
any local regulator, in any jurisdiction. In Portugal, neither the author of this report nor his/her academic 
supervisor is registered with or qualified under COMISSÃO DO MERCADO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS (“CMVM”, the 
Portuguese Securities Market Authority) as a financial analyst. No approval for publication or distribution of this 
report was required and/or obtained from any local authority, given the exclusive academic nature of the report. 
The additional disclaimers also apply: 
USA: Pursuant to Section 202 (a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, neither Nova SBE nor the author 
of this report are to be qualified as an investment adviser and, thus, registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”, United States of America’s securities market authority) is not necessary. 













Germany: Pursuant to §34c of the WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, i.e., the German Securities Trading Act), 
this entity is not required to register with or otherwise notify the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(“BaFin”, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). It should be noted that Nova SBE is a fully-
owned state university and there is no relation between the student’s equity reports and any fund raising 
programme. 
UK: Pursuant to section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”), for an activity to be 
a regulated activity, it must be carried on “by way of business”. All regulated activities are subject to prior 
authorization by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). However, this report serves an exclusively academic 
purpose and, as such, was not prepared by way of business. The author - a Master’s student - is the sole and 
exclusive responsible for the information, estimates and forecasts contained herein, and for the opinions 
expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own judgment at the date of the report. Nova SBE and its faculty 
have no single and formal position in relation to the most appropriate valuation method, estimates or projections 
used in the report and may not be held liable by the author’s choice of the latter. 
The information contained in this report was compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but Nova SBE, its faculty, or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, and accept 
no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or of its content. 
Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start covering 
and/or suspend the coverage of any listed company, at any time, without prior notice. The students or Nova 
SBE are not responsible for updating this report, and the opinions and recommendations expressed herein may 
change without further notice. 
The target company or security of this report may be simultaneously covered by more than one student. 
Because each student is free to choose the valuation method, and make his/her own assumptions and 
estimates, the resulting projections, price target and recommendations may differ widely, even when referring 
to the same security. Moreover, changing market conditions and/or changing subjective opinions may lead to 
significantly different valuation results. Other students’ opinions, estimates and recommendations, as well as 
the advisor and other faculty members’ opinions may be inconsistent with the views expressed in this report. 
Any recipient of this report should understand that statements regarding future prospects and performance are, 
by nature, subjective, and may be fallible. 
This report does not necessarily mention and/or analyze all possible risks arising from the investment in the 
target company and/or security, namely the possible exchange rate risk resulting from the security being 
denominated in a currency either than the investor’s currency, among many other risks. 
The purpose of publishing this report is merely academic and it is not intended for distribution among private 
investors. The information and opinions expressed in this report are not intended to be available to any person 
other than Portuguese natural or legal persons or persons domiciled in Portugal. While preparing this report, 
students did not have in consideration the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs 
 
 








of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in any 
security, namely in the security covered by this report. 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal opinion 
about the target company and its securities. He/ She has not received or been promised any direct or indirect 
compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report. 
[If applicable, it shall be added: “While preparing the report, the author may have performed an internship 
(remunerated or not) in Lufthansa. This Company may have or have had an interest in the covered company 
or security” and/ or “A draft of the reports have been shown to the covered company’s officials (Investors 
Relations Officer or other), mainly for the purpose of correcting inaccuracies, and later modified, prior to its 
publication.”]  
The content of each report has been shown or made public to restricted parties prior to its publication in Nova 
SBE’s website or in Bloomberg Professional, for academic purposes such as its distribution among faculty 
members for students’ academic evaluation. 
Nova SBE is a state-owned university, mainly financed by state subsidies, students tuition fees and companies, 
through donations, or indirectly by hiring educational programs, among other possibilities. Thus, Nova SBE 
may have received compensation from the target company during the last 12 months, related to its fundraising 
programs, or indirectly through the sale of educational, consulting or research services. Nevertheless, no 
compensation eventually received by Nova SBE is in any way related to or dependent on the opinions 
expressed in this report. The Nova School of Business and Economics does not deal for or otherwise offer any 
investment or intermediation services to market counterparties, private or intermediate customers. 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published, in whole or in part, without the explicit previous 
consent of its author, unless when used by Nova SBE for academic purposes only. At any time, Nova SBE may 
decide to suspend this report reproduction or distribution without further notice. Neither this document nor any 
copy of it may be taken, transmitted or distributed, directly or indirectly, in any country either than Portugal or 
to any resident outside this country. The dissemination of this document other than in Portugal or to Portuguese 
citizens is therefore prohibited and unlawful. 
